The Challenges of U.S. Counterinsurgency in Multicultural Afghanistan | Analytical Essay Example

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The Challenges of U.S. Counterinsurgency in Multicultural Afghanistan | Analytical Essay Example

1.0 Introduction

The launch of Operation Enduring Freedom by the United States in 2001 marked the beginning of the Afghanistan war by Americans who wanted to eliminate the Taliban’s backed government. According to Lister after succeeding in their mission of overthrowing the Taliban government, the Taliban reinvented themselves and emerge as an insurgent movement that was hidden both outsides and inside the country, this transformation posed a struggle to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) which entailed forces from 47 nations and caused dangerous attacks to the forces to destabilize the international security and hence remained to be a difficult puzzle to solve[1].

According to Jones the much-admired US Army, as well as the US Marine corps, defined the insurgency as a well-coordinated, prolonged, politico-military scuffle that is meant to dwindle the legitimacy and control of a recognized government, conquering power, or authority politically while at the same time growing insurgent control[2].

Cassidy stated that Operation Enduring Freedom was basically an eccentric operation conducted by the military companies that comprise of US and British forces in collaboration with the Afghan Northern Alliance[3]. Gillard indicated that it is important to note that while the invasion appeared to be successful the situation later called for the deployment of conventional forces which was to fully eliminate the elements of the Taliban as well as Al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan[4].

However, According to Hoehn, Andrew and Sarah this failed to happen as a substantial number of Al-Qaeda as well as the Taliban forces flee into the neighboring country of Pakistan the consequence of this together with the fact that the new west backed government under Karzai leadership failed to reconstruct and politically stamp authority in the nation the Taliban sneaked into the country and started operating as an insurgent force[5]. Coll stated that Taliban insurgency had become more tactful by 2006 and shifted in the way they used to carry attacks as they targeted large-scale attacks mostly in urban centers where the impact could be felt more[6].

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2.0 Background of Afghanistan war History

From the year 1880 to 1929 during the establishment of the modern nation-state, Afghanistan has seen almost seven key battles. According to Johnson, Thomas and Barry the war started during the construction of the state as well as the formation of a federal authority which took place between 1880-1901; later on, this was followed by the battle with British India which happened in the year 1919 as well as the guerrilla war of 1979 to 1992 which was against the invasion of the Soviet Union as well as the administration of the communist in Kabul; moving forward to the civil war between the rival mujahedeen groups which happened between 1992 to 1996; and finally the recent war against the Taliban after the 9/11 attack in the United States, this portrays the fact that war has been a continuous event in the country and almost every generation has experienced it due to the consistent and constant nature of it in Afghanistan[7].

The majority of the literature written on Afghanistan has a habit of depicting Afghanistan as terra incognita, the graveyard of empires, and the land of the tribes as well as the homes of warlords. According to Wittmeyer the latest analysis from the media regarding Afghanistan’s politics inclines to the cultural approach, which overlooks the historical background of the happenings as well as the sociopolitical conditions[8]. Wittmeyer affirmed this point by indicating that Mahmud Mamdani stated that there is a “cultural talk” in regards to Afghanistan[9]. Connecting war, as well as a conflict to political culture, is reductionist as well as conventional. According to Nazif Shahrani, the cultural factors doesn’t link directly with the social conditions, hence, the Afghanistan war should be premeditated about the political culture of the country, border national, political economy as well as the history of the region.

2.1 Divided subcultures

Afghanistan’s political culture is a mixture of traditional and religious fundamentals, distributed subcultures as well as communally reinforcing fissures. According to Lister the political culture and social edifice of Afghanistan are different from one region to the other as well as from nationality to nationality, incorporating a language, religion, and ethnicity which is heterogeneous[10]. Schlosser, Nicholas, and James stated that highlighting cultural and societal heterogeneity of Afghanistan, Ravan Farhadi was of the point of view that Afghanistan is a country of minority based on the fact that there is no ethnic faction which is dominant or makes up a third of the total population.

In contrast with the mainstream point of view that disregards the diversity of the land, the fact is that Afghanistan is not a completely tribal society. Goodhand, Jonathan, and Aziz indicated the fact that it is rather a multicultural entity that comprises of both non-tribal and tribal communities[11]. According to Wittmeyer the largest non-tribal community is referred to as Tajiks which amounts to one-third of the Afghanistan population[12]. Nevertheless, the Mirs and Khans have mostly dominated in the leadership position at the local level in the society of the Tajiks. During the 9th to 12th centuries, the Tajik was dominant politically together with Samanids, Tahirids, Ghurid, and Safaids and they currently establish the urban population of almost entire provinces in Afghanistan.

The Tajiks in the urban areas are administrators, merchants as well as clerics whereas the Tajik in the rural areas are mostly farmers. Johnson, Thomas, and Barry stated that the Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Amaqs, Balouch, and Hazaras are largely tribal. Pashtuns have a cohesive tribal bond to the extent that they can trace their genes to a common ancestor[13]. Meyerle et al observed that in comparison to the other tribes, they are either yet to be recognized by their tribal decedents externally, for instance, the Hazaras, or their hereditary attribute faded and was swept away at some point in the past, those that fall into this category are the Turkmen and Uzbeks[14].

According to Johnson, Thomas, and Wali, Hazaras tribal framework was reduced to a greater extent in the aftermath of the mass killings which took place between 1880 and 1901 by King Abdurrahman Khan who belongs to the Shiite[15]. Wittmeyer stated that Hazaras encountered considerable discrimination right till the rule of king Abdurrahman till 1998 which was the end of the first republic the minorities were supported by the communist government to some degree and even their rights were considered. According to Eikenberry the north of Afghanistan had the Uzbeks who were speaking Turkic and the tribe became dominant politically during the 10th century together with Ghaznavids[16]. The tribes that speak Pashtu are divided into three based on the political as well as the social structures: the Kuchis, Ghilzais, and the Durranis.

Inadequate structural, as well as an institutional mechanism for the housing of the level of cultural diversity in Afghanistan, has been key in promoting the social injustices and overpowering of the minorities and finally the political instability in Afghanistan.

2.2 Cultural assimilation

Hoehn, Andrew, and Sarah agreed to the fact that the current nation-state of Afghanistan has been made on the consequence of 2 main factors: the rivalry between Russia and the British as well as the internal suppression of different ethnicities and nations by the leaders of Afghanistan. According to Gillard despite having an assorted political culture at the state level as well as being a multinational country, the culture of the Pashtun, as well as the kinship framework, has constituted the nature of Afghanistan as a state for the last two centuries.

Eikenberry stated that from the mid-18th century when power was with the Pashtuns courtesy of Ahmad Shah Abdali in the year 1747, the Pashtuns culture politically has been the significant factor in the national politics of Afghanistan. Jones added that the tribal culture that was kin-based imposed a hierarchical social framework at the national level in regards to politics[17]. About this 18th century. The reason behind it was the political framework, the Durrani Pashtun are placed at the peak of the pyramid; Ghilzia Pashtun comes in second place, Tajiks third place, and Uzbeks and Hazaras follow in that sequence.

According to Lister the nation-building process which was assimilated placed the Pashtun in a strategic position as the nation of Afghanistan became more of a tribalized national state[18]. Wittmeyer argued that the main agenda behind the consolidation of power by the Pashtuns was pushed by the colonial powers in collaboration with the Pashtun rulers which transformed Afghanistan into a Rentier state. In the 19th as well as the 20th century the leaders were funded by the British. For instance, Abdurrahman Khan was annually being sponsored a sum of 1.8 million rupees by the British. According to Cassidy since the year 1950, this role has been taken by the Soviet and United States respectively[19]. The assimilation was adopted by Mahmud Trzi who was the founder of sej al Akhbar newspaper in the year 1911 as well as most of the foreign ministers of Afghanistan in the year 1919. Cassidy added by stating that these leaders were later on affected by the nationalist ideologist of the Ottoman Young Turks.

Organized religious, linguistic, and ethnic discernment and rebellion against Habibullah Kalakani who was a king belonging to the Tajik tribe in the year 1929 were the results of this framework. Gillard demonstrated that the state framework, as well as resources, were in favor of a specific ethnic group leaving other groups to be oppressed and feel isolated from the process of the national building and this increased the social rifts among the ethnic groups.

2.3 Militarization of society

According to Goodhand, Jonathan, and Aziz, the heterogeneity in Afghanistan has been reframed and reconstituted throughout diverse socioeconomic conditions[20]. For example, the course of nation-state building that took place in the 19th and 20th century and society militarization, as well as the warlordism, are two processes that provide evidence to this claim. Meyerle et al argued that the culture in regards to politics of such a nationally varied country has been recreated through an oppressive, violent tribal hereditary rule- a political culture that is ethnicized by one social group and imposed on the others[21].

Schlosser, Nicholas, and James stated that the fall of the despotic monarch that happened in 1983 resulted in a slow weakening of the authority of the state, this made the oppressed ethnic group to gain a chance of speaking out and proclaim their identity through violence in the 1990s.

Correspondingly, the fight against the Soviets, the subsequent civil war as well as the conflict against the Taliban who were sponsored by the Pakistani, should not be assessed based on cultural factors like social, religion traditional among others, this is according to Hoehn, Andrew, and Sarah[22]. As stated by Mahmud Mamdani the Islamic revolution that happened in Iran, as well as the politics of the cold war, are core factors that catalyzed the radicalization of Islam as well as the militarization of the region.

Schlosser, Nicholas, and James demonstrated the fact that to be able to defeat the Russians and segregate Iran, the United States states agenda of mobilizing the entire Muslim community worldwide to stage a holy war against the Russians and to hold Iran through re-enforcing of the Sunni-Shiite division[23]. According to Wittmeyer, the fight against the Russians was a campaign, which was rejuvenated by the United States to prevent the interest of Russia in Afghanistan as well as the entire Middle East region. Meyerle et al stated that religious school was also known as “madrassas” and was used as a place to do training for religious warriors. Lister indicated that this resulted in the emergence of a large number of radicalized and violent Muslim warriors whose fury was linked to their own radicalized interpretation of their religious book and the graduate of the school were Taliban warriors.

According to Johnson, Thomas, and Barry an elongation of war and the militarization of the people which happened in the 80s and 90s, lack of open-mindedness for embracing diversity well as the failure of the establishment of unified government by the mujahedeen in 1992 changed the formerly dormant ethnic protests into a violent and conflict amongst each other[24].

According to Wittmeyer by considering the socio-cultural conditions that resulted in the warlords to get power throughout Afghanistan, the book “empires of mud” by Antonio Giustozzi states that the social structure and the ethnic composition of Afghanistan I the core factor that led to the rise of warlords as well as the military class[25]. Nevertheless, Cassidy observed that it was the war against the Russians in the 1980s that changed the structure of the society[26]. In the period just before the war, Khan was on top of the social structure of various ethnicities. For instance, Khan assumed the role of lords among Hazaras and Tajiks of Badakhshan. This led to the emergence of a new military class out of the populations in the rural regions. Gillard indicated that the economic, as well as the social structures of the society, permitted this military class to make as well as create the economic and social base. Khan’s position has now been taken by this military new class.

The pedigree of the conflict and war in Afghanistan is the outcome of the absence of power-sharing as well as an institutional mechanism for embracing various groups. According to Coll, the construction of the nation-state along tribal lines has led to the establishment of a consolidated as well as the despotic state, which implemented prejudiced rules against minorities. Eikenberry stated that such rules officialized and intensified grievances and these protests have emerged to be a key factor for the continuous war[27]. The transnational structure could act as a solution by providing a technique for a broad-based, inclusive as well as multicultural state.

3.0 Why American Failed

There has been an argument based on the fact that the Afghanistan intervention was not properly done. According to Cassidy, if only the United States had focused on dealing with the right warlord, focus on the right counterinsurgency strategy as well as fully focus on Afghanistan instead of the distractions by Iraq, there would be a massive success in their mission in Afghanistan[28]. Goodhand, Jonathan, and Aziz stated that the problem was simple: the US and the western allies were trying to do something impossible and that was not needed to be done which was based on wrong assumptions, the assumption that Afghanistan posed an existential danger to global security was not well thought of and the fact the US viewed Afghanistan as a failed state showed they lacked knowledge and clear understanding of the country hence they thinking and the situation did more wrong in stabilizing the nation. Schlosser, Nicholas, and James indicated that the theories that the policymakers used depicted the way they were too afraid to come to the reality that their mission in Afghanistan was too ambitious and to some extent unnecessary[29].

The strategy that the United States employed was faced with serious challenges. According to Meyerle et al, they were to target only the insurgency and protect the local population[30]. It was difficult to identify a Taliban from the ordinary local citizen because they dressed the same and lived in the same area. Moreover, Jones stated that the threats were not only from the Taliban insurgents both the narcotraffickers and the corrupt government officials. Gillard argued that the country was also faced with ethnic violence and some communities frequently requested the services of the Taliban during the skirmishes with the ethnic group that appeared to be extremely powerful. Lister affirmed this by adding that there was also a lack of jobs for the youth who were vulnerable and easily convinced by the Taliban to join them. Eikenberry stated that these conditions among more were really critical challenges that the US military forces faced daily as they try to implement the counterinsurgency doctrine in Afghanistan.

The policymakers were fascinated by assurances of state-building as well as counterinsurgency strategy and by the notion that they were experts’ who actually knew how to do things. According to Goodhand, Jonathan, and Aziz, the reality was that that strategy was based on selective evidence, flawed logic as well as deceptive historical and geographical judgments (Bosnia, British Malaya, the American Philippines) the strategies of the policymakers which focused on counterinsurgency and state-building as well as by the notion[31]. Lister stated that the strategies were to focus on the rule of law as well as a civil society this was contrary to the way justice was traditionally being administered and embraced in the Afghanistan villages where the majority of the population lived[32].

Based on the fact that counterinsurgency had a mission of securing the border, form a credible government as well as earn trust from the local population, the question that lay on the ground is whether they were to succeed with this. According to Hoehn, Andrew, and Sarah, most of the local population were disappointed by the Americans invading their country and actually treated them with suspicion. According to Meyerle et al, the locals and even the police saw Americans as enemies and they wanted to eliminate and kill them[33]. Johnson, Thomas, and Wali stated that all the initiative funded and supported by Americans that aimed at state-building and counterinsurgency relied on the trust as well as the transparent interaction between the American forces and the local population. Gillard observed that the Afghanistan environment did not offer such a conducive environment as the forces lacked the knowledge, the commitment of the local population as well as skills to fully transform Afghanistan into the state they were yearning for[34].

It became evident during the war that the policymakers were too secluded from the genuineness of Afghanistan to come to the clear fact that the theories they had in mind, as well as their mission in Afghanistan to develop a Western-backed state, was close to impossible this is based on Jones point of view. According to Lister because Afghanistan is composed of different tribes and languages the officials, as well as the soldiers, find it difficult to fluently speak Afghan languages, and the terrorist threats which were rampant during this period of time locked the officials and limited their interaction with the locals hence this played a critical role in ensuring they don’t create a good rapport and understanding with the locals[35].

Wittmeyer stated that there was also an aspect of fear which turned into guilt from both the locals, the allied forces, and the US forces who had both lost thousands of people during their stay in Afghanistan. According to Jones America had a high expectation in Afghanistan and had spent billions of dollars in stabilizing the nation the cultural component of the Afghan local became a major hindrance to American dreams, the fact that politicians took it upon themselves and saw that it was their moral obligation to protect the locals especially the women it played a part in blocking the evaluation of the risks, the cost as well as the benefits of operations in Afghanistan.

The point of view was created by Gen. Stanley and Gen Petraeus in 2009 on the military counterinsurgency strategy forecast on a state-building policy. Lister argued that this policy entailed the development of an incredible, legitimate effective Afghan state. However, this was only theorized as there were zero chances of this as they failed to offer a concrete region. Cassidy stated that there was also a lack of projection and evidence that the United States could create such a stable state in the multicultural country that has been in a constant war for many decades now and centuries now. According to Coll because the government that was to be formed was to be headed by Hamid Karzai who had worked with the Americans for the last 8 years the major aim of the war seems unachievable as the vices like corruption, weak government, as well as instability, seems to be a forever thing in Afghanistan.

The issue was not that the USA did not do the right thing, it was that the US tried the surge at all. According to Johnson, Thomas, and Wali the 2003 operation was constructive as well as justifiable but considering the nature of the Afghani culture as well as the society on one hand and on the other hand the America and NATO soldiers, ambition, attitude and incentive it becomes apparent that the mission was bound to fail[36].

According to Wittmeyer, The United States made three huge mistakes that played a role in destabilizing the South Asia region and contributed overall to international terrorism. The first error made was by having defeated Russia with the assistance of Pakistan in the year 1989, the Americans neglected Afghanistan as well as distanced themselves from Afghanistan main ally Pakistan[37]. To add to this the relationship between India and the United States became stronger and this was never taken kindly by Pakistan who had been an ally of the United States since 1948. Coll stated that Pakistan was also sanctioned and the aftermath played a critical role in destabilizing Afghanistan. Form 1989 the warlordism riveted Afghanistan for 12 years as well as the ethnic clashes within different ethnic groups[38]. Hoehn, Andrew, and Sarah demonstrated that there was a merge between some factions of mujahedeen and al-Qaida which later on made the Taliban gain full control of Kabul in 1999. This was instigated by Pakistan as they tried to retaliate on the fact that the United States had lost interest in them

The second error according to Wittmeyer was that the United States made was its effort to segregate the Taliban once they assumed power[39]. In 1996 Pakistan was the only country that embraced the Taliban government, during a visit by then-president Clinton in 2000, he strongly warned Pakistan of dire consequences if she does not end the diplomatic relationship with the Taliban group. According to Coll, this was a blunder in the sense the United States had a chance of working with the Taliban and try and stabilize the nation through the Taliban rule as the group was in a better condition considering they come from the locals and have a better understanding of the practice theory practicable: Towards more sustainable forms of consumption. Journal of Consumer culture and social factors of the region. By this, the US could focus on modifying the behavior of the Taliban and earn their trust. According to Jones this could have resulted in less destruction contrary to what was experienced as well as more pressure for Osama Bin Laden as the Taliban leader together with the Taliban government which could have been backed by the western governments could have put more pressure on him and as a result, maybe the September 9/11 attack could have been avoided.

The third error according to Wittmeyer was that the United State together with its allies defeated Afghanistan and failed to transform the military victory into a victory of political transformation in Afghanistan[40]. According to Hoehn, Andrew, and Sarah, the political structure that was put in place after the victory did not have the backing of the Afghan population and this resulted in the reemergence of the Taliban from 2005-2006[41]. The fact that the US used the formed alliance with the northern tribes who were the majority after which they reinstalled them as leaders of the government was extremely a wrong move as the Pashtuns who were the majority and most of them were Taliban were ready to fight for the leadership which based on their dominance made a lot of sense.

According to Lister, the insurgent sanctuary Afghanistan was also situated in Pakistan, the Taliban, Skin and other insurgent factions use the haven to rearm, train as well as make operational and strategic planning this made it cumbersome for the United States forces whose concentration was based on Afghanistan and they failed to locate this hidden sanctuary which was the backbone of the operations of the insurgent group[42]. Coll stated that the intelligence system of Pakistan was relied on by the groups to gather intelligence and act on it[43].

Johnson, Thomas, and Wali stated that the Afghans had a very strong relationship with their neighbors which included Pakistan, Iran, and India and this made the west economic nations with the sophisticated expertise to fail to earn such a relationship. According to Gillard for the US counterinsurgency to have succeeded there was only one way out and which was to leverage hostility towards the northern non-Pashtun communities and by effectively doing this they needed to have worked with the key neighboring players in the region which had an influence on Non-Pashtun people and this required diplomatic humility.

According to Lister the Taliban initially had a direct engagement at the battlefield with Americans and the allies, they, later on, changed the tactics to the use of IED and later on changed to attacking the key people in the Afghan government[44]. This illustrates how the Afghans can easily adapt and their resilience nature which is gained through the centuries of war that the nation has had.

Conclusion

Finally, the major determinant of identity in Afghanistan remains to be ethnicity. Ethnicity affects how bordering countries associate with the Afghans. For instance, the Taliban who were majorly from the Pashtun tribe, and though they were the majority it was hard for them to take charge of the whole of Afghanistan, American troops on the other hand-aligned themselves to non-Pashtuns in which the same rule applied it was hard for the counterinsurgency to take full control without uniting the different ethnic groups of Afghanistan.

The Multicultural environment in Afghanistan complicated the mission of the United States Counterinsurgency troops. The ethnic rivalry from the top government position to the locals was so intense and the fact that the country has been constantly in war with no amicable solution found to stabilize the country, the Pashtuns who were majorly aligned to the Taliban held a key role in stabilizing the country due to their popularity. The troops could have worked towards uniting the community and eliminating or reducing the rivalry to ensure the Afghans work together, but the blunder they made by allying with the Northern tribes remains to be the blunder that is majorly associated with the current instability in Afghanistan.

Bibliography

Cassidy, Robert M. 2012. War, will, and warlords: counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001-2011. Quantico, Va: Marine Corps University Press.

Coll, Steve. Directorate S: The CIA and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001–2016. Penguin UK, 2018.

 Eikenberry, Karl. 2013. “The Limits Of Counterinsurgency Doctrine In Afghanistan”. Foreign Affairs.

Gillard, Arthur. 2013. The war in Afghanistan. Detroit: Greenhaven Press.

Goodhand, Jonathan, and Aziz Hakimi. 2014. Counterinsurgency, local militias, and state-building in Afghanistan. http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo57894.

Hoehn, Andrew R., and Sarah Harting. 2010. Risking NATO: testing the limits of the Alliance in Afghanistan. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

Johnson, Thomas H., and Barry Zellen, eds. Culture, Conflict, and Counterinsurgency. Stanford University Press, 2014.

Johnson, Thomas, and Wali Shaker. Taliban narratives: The use and power of stories in the Afghanistan conflict. Oxford University Press, 2018.

Jones, Seth G. 2008. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Santa Monica: RAND.

Lister, Charles. 2011. “business interventions in most companies and industrial sectors. Russian politicians held prominent seats with invalid certifications from Cultural Awareness And Counterinsurgency In Afghanistan”. E-International Relations. https://www.e-ir.info/2011/03/11/cultural-awareness-and-counterinsurgency-in-afghanistan/.

Meyerle, Gerald, Megan Katt, and Jim Gavrilis. 2012. On the ground in Afghanistan: counterinsurgency in practice. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press.

Schlosser, Nicholas J., and James M. Caiella. 2011. Counterinsurgency leadership in Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press.

Wittmeyer, Alicia. 2013. “What Went Wrong In Afghanistan?”. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/04/what-went-wrong-in-afghanistan/.

  1. Lister, Charles. 2011. “business interventions in most companies and industrial sectors. Russian politicians held prominent seats with invalid certifications from Cultural Awareness And Counterinsurgency In Afghanistan”. E-International Relations. https://www.e-ir.info/2011/03/11/cultural-awareness-and-counterinsurgency-in-afghanistan/. ↑
  2. Jones, Seth G. 2008. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Santa Monica: RAND. ↑
  3. Cassidy, Robert M. 2012. War, will, and warlords: counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001-2011. Quantico, Va: Marine Corps University Press. ↑
  4. Gillard, Arthur. 2013. The war in Afghanistan. Detroit: Greenhaven Press. ↑
  5. Hoehn, Andrew R., and Sarah Harting. 2010. Risking NATO: testing the limits of the Alliance in Afghanistan. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
  6. Coll, Steve. Directorate S: The CIA and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001–2016. Penguin UK, 2018. ↑
  7. Johnson, Thomas H., and Barry Zellen, eds. Culture, Conflict, and Counterinsurgency. Stanford University Press, 2014. ↑
  8. Wittmeyer, Alicia. 2013. “What Went Wrong In Afghanistan?”. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/04/what-went-wrong-in-afghanistan/. ↑
  9. Ibid., ↑
  10. Lister, Charles. 2011. “health care, cultural factors have a strong influence on patients’ and families” decisions. Some Cultural Awareness And Counterinsurgency In Afghanistan”. E-International Relations. https://www.e-ir.info/2011/03/11/cultural-awareness-and-counterinsurgency-in-afghanistan/. ↑
  11. Goodhand, Jonathan, and Aziz Hakimi. 2014. Counterinsurgency, local militias, and state-building in Afghanistan. http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo57894. ↑
  12. Wittmeyer, Alicia. 2013. “What Went Wrong In Afghanistan?”. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/04/what-went-wrong-in-afghanistan/. ↑
  13. Johnson, Thomas H., and Barry Zellen, eds. Culture, Conflict, and Counterinsurgency. Stanford University Press, 2014. ↑
  14. Meyerle, Gerald, Megan Katt, and Jim Gavrilis. 2012. On the ground in Afghanistan: counterinsurgency in practice. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press. ↑
  15. Johnson, Thomas, and Wali Shaker. Taliban narratives: The use and power of stories in the Afghanistan conflict. Oxford University Press, 2018. ↑
  16.  Eikenberry, Karl. 2013. “The Limits Of Counterinsurgency Doctrine In Afghanistan”. Foreign Affairs.  ↑
  17. Gillard, Arthur. 2013. The war in Afghanistan. Detroit: Greenhaven Press. ↑
  18. Lister, Charles. 2011. “health care, cultural factors have a strong influence on patients’ and families” decisions. Some Cultural Awareness And Counterinsurgency In Afghanistan”. E-International Relations. https://www.e-ir.info/2011/03/11/cultural-awareness-and-counterinsurgency-in-afghanistan/. ↑
  19. Cassidy, Robert M. 2012. War, will, and warlords: counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001-2011. Quantico, Va: Marine Corps University Press. ↑
  20. Goodhand, Jonathan, and Aziz Hakimi. 2014. Counterinsurgency, local militias, and state-building in Afghanistan. http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo57894. ↑
  21. Meyerle, Gerald, Megan Katt, and Jim Gavrilis. 2012. On the ground in Afghanistan: counterinsurgency in practice. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press. ↑
  22. Hoehn, Andrew R., and Sarah Harting. 2010. Risking NATO: testing the limits of the Alliance in Afghanistan. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
  23. Schlosser, Nicholas J., and James M. Caiella. 2011. Counterinsurgency leadership in Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press. ↑
  24. Johnson, Thomas H., and Barry Zellen, eds. Culture, Conflict, and Counterinsurgency. Stanford University Press, 2014. ↑
  25. Wittmeyer, Alicia. 2013. “What Went Wrong In Afghanistan?”. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/04/what-went-wrong-in-afghanistan/. ↑
  26. Cassidy, Robert M. 2012. War, will, and warlords: counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001-2011. Quantico, Va: Marine Corps University Press. ↑
  27.  Eikenberry, Karl. 2013. “The Limits Of Counterinsurgency Doctrine In Afghanistan”. Foreign Affairs. ↑
  28. Cassidy, Robert M. 2012. War, will, and warlords: counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001-2011. Quantico, Va: Marine Corps University Press. ↑
  29. Schlosser, Nicholas J., and James M. Caiella. 2011. Counterinsurgency leadership in Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press. ↑
  30. Meyerle, Gerald, Megan Katt, and Jim Gavrilis. 2012. On the ground in Afghanistan: counterinsurgency in practice. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press. ↑
  31. Goodhand, Jonathan, and Aziz Hakimi. 2014. Counterinsurgency, local militias, and state-building in Afghanistan. http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo57894. ↑
  32. Lister, Charles. 2011. “culture shock upon arriving in the United States. These students must understand the Cultural Awareness And Counterinsurgency In Afghanistan”. E-International Relations. https://www.e-ir.info/2011/03/11/cultural-awareness-and-counterinsurgency-in-afghanistan/. ↑
  33. Meyerle, Gerald, Megan Katt, and Jim Gavrilis. 2012. On the ground in Afghanistan: counterinsurgency in practice. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press. ↑
  34. Gillard, Arthur. 2013. The war in Afghanistan. Detroit: Greenhaven Press. ↑
  35. Gillard, Arthur. 2013. The war in Afghanistan. Detroit: Greenhaven Press. ↑
  36. Johnson, Thomas H., and Barry Zellen, eds. Culture, Conflict, and Counterinsurgency. Stanford University Press, 2014. ↑
  37. Wittmeyer, Alicia. 2013. “What Went Wrong In Afghanistan?”. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/04/what-went-wrong-in-afghanistan/. ↑
  38. Coll, Steve. Directorate S: The CIA and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001–2016. Penguin UK, 2018. ↑
  39. Wittmeyer, Alicia. 2013. “What Went Wrong In Afghanistan?”. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/04/what-went-wrong-in-afghanistan/ ↑
  40. Ibid., ↑
  41. Hoehn, Andrew R., and Sarah Harting. 2010. Risking NATO: testing the limits of the Alliance in Afghanistan. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
  42. Lister, Charles. 2011. “culture shock upon arriving in the United States. These students must understand the Cultural Awareness And Counterinsurgency In Afghanistan”. E-International Relations. https://www.e-ir.info/2011/03/11/cultural-awareness-and-counterinsurgency-in-afghanistan/. ↑
  43. Coll, Steve. Directorate S: The CIA and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001–2016. Penguin UK, 2018. ↑
  44. Lister, Charles. 2011. “education and schooling. Schools do bring together individuals from different socioeconomic and Cultural Awareness And Counterinsurgency In Afghanistan”. E-International Relations. https://www.e-ir.info/2011/03/11/cultural-awareness-and-counterinsurgency-in-afghanistan/. ↑

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