Judicial independence in Iraq

Judicial independence in Iraq | Essay Freelance Writers

Challenges to the judicial role and judicial independence in Iraq

1- Supreme Court Tuner

There are several ambiguities regarding the laws concerning the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court that have the potential to negatively impact upon judicial review. This court possesses the authority to rule on inconsistencies that exist between Iraq’s Transitional Administrative Law and the other laws that govern the nation, disputes between the regional governments and transitional government, and ordinary appeals that are prescribed by law. However, the only criteria for this court’s membership are that it contains a total of nine members.[1] This creates the possibility of individuals becoming members who do not have an adequate level of separation from the government or the interests of other specific groups in society, which constitutes a direct threat to judicial independence.

It is also notable that the Federal Supreme Court Law does not contain any provision stating when judges should be removed from the court.[2] This means that the court is susceptible to judges being removed because they do not comply with the wishes of figures within the government. If judges can be removed for their comments or their conduct in court then it creates a situation in which they no longer possess complete independence. Therefore, the lack of clear laws governing this issue means that the impartiality of judges within the nation is called into question.[3]

2- De-Ba’athification

Anderson and Pimentel have identified ‘de-Ba’athification’ as posing a risk to judicial independence in Iraq by weakening the judicial review.[4] De-Ba’athification refers to the process of banning anybody who had previously been a member of Saddam Hussein’s political party from occupying a role in any public office in Iraq or taking part in politics within the nation.[5] The Ba’ath Party was the Arab nationalist, a secular political party that ruled Iraq before the conclusion of the conflict.[6] The motivation for implementing this process was that if Saddam’s power was to be stripped away from him, logic dictated that his associates should also have their power taken away from them.[7]

However, there have been suggestions that this process has been utilized to remove judges from their positions because of unpopular decisions that they have made rather than because they were formerly allied with Saddam Hussein. An example of this is Medhat Al-Mahmoud, a Chief Justice of the Federal Supreme Court who was alleged to have previously supported Saddam[8] and taught other judges to carry out actions that were against the interests of the Iraqi people. Some argued that this was not the true motivation for his removal from the judiciary and that it was actually motivated by the controversial decision that he made to get rid of the terms-limit legislation, which was a ruling that was viewed as proving the prime minister with a degree of protection against political challenges throughout the years to come.

Al-Mahmoud was reinstated after appealing the decision at the Court of Cassation. However, it has been argued that his initial removal sent a message that judges were vulnerable to being removed from their positions if they made decisions that the government did not agree with. The point has been made that the fact that the de-Ba’athification Commission, which was established to carry out the process of de-Ba’athification, can remove judges from their positions, is a challenge to Iraq’s judicial independence. It means that the Commission can utilize Ba’athification proceedings to influence the judiciary.[9]

In 2003, a special panel of the highest appellate court in Iraq, the Court of Cassation, in their ruling reversed an important determinant of the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC) of Iraq. AJC was the body responsible for and mandated to purge the members of the Baath party from the offices of the government. One of the earliest determinations as discussed earlier concerned Medhat al-Mahmoud, the former justice of the federal Supreme Court of Iraq. Specifically, AJC determined that Medhat was not in any way eligible for any public office because of his previous positions he had held during the era of Saddam Hussein. The AJC went as far as to refer to the highly respected judge in Iraq as “Saddamist” who during his tenure taught other judges to commit offenses to the people of Iraq. . The reversal of the determination by the Courts of Cassation was a deep indictment of the whole process by which the process of de-Ba’athification was being conducted and how it infringed on the independence of the judiciary.

Some of the suggestions of AJC were disqualifications of the Baath party’s former members as set for the in ten different subsections under Article 6 of the Iraqi law. The provisions stated that government employees at that time who belonged to the higher ranks from the fourth rank in the hierarchy Ba’ath party were to be retried forcibly. Those who belonged to the third rank or even higher were not to serve in any security ministries specified: the presidency, the Higher Judicial Council, and other sensitive positions. The influence and authority to determine who serves in the Higher Judicial Council by AJC were seen as contravening the independence of the judiciary and also putting societies deem as normal gender roles. Gender is personal, part of everyone’s developing identity and web of relationships, but it is also political pressure on the judiciary.

Heavy political influence on the judiciary in Iraq after post-war was also evident in the trial of Medhat al-Mahmoud, the former justice of the federal Supreme Court of Iraq. Rather than a clear judicial process, the AJC engaged in politicization and innuendo, and name-calling than anything that resembles a proper judicial process. Therefore, the AJC indicated only that they rendered their decision by Article 6 of the law as guided bysection1 (9). The quoted section 1(9) merely defined “supporters of the regime,” and also do not constitute a ground for any disqualification. Additionally, for section 6, the AJC in their submissions did not specify any subsection or even point to anything that seemed to fit under any of the subsections applicable. The evidence of AJC was that (1) the chief justice has assisted in appointing of judiciary members to higher positions who later turned out to be regimes’ strong supporters, (2) that justice had been promoted rapidly through the judiciary ranks, including appointment to the court of Cassation in a process that was unusually and involved Saddam intervention, and (3) that the chief justice was awarded different honors and awards during the period.

From the submissions and arguments of AJC, a body entrusted with the expedition of the de-Ba’athification process, it is evident that the processes intended to undermine the judiciary, politicize judicial processes, and influence its operations. There is nothing in Article 6 that authorized the AJC to disqualify any individual from a government position, on the grounds set forth by AJC. This was the point the panel of the court of Cassation correctly made with some force. () argued that the decision was to such controversial since it was agreed widely that the chief justice was a Ba’athist of a higher rank, the point in the judicial process was not to act on the basis that it is agreed widely, but only that which is proven.

3- Politicians influences:

The judicial independence of post-war Iraq from the influence of the politicians has been a subject in many forums. Historically, the judiciary in Iraq built a reputation for neutrality, independent thinking, a proactive adaptation of the new techniques, learning, and methodology, and search for justice ().To some extent, () indicated that the historical structure gets credit for this as the civil law system allowed the judges to explore both evidence and the arguments provided or presented in the courts. However, () pointed out that during certain times, the post-war Iraqi judiciary faces extreme pressure on the judges where different forces and actors prefer less independent cases review.

According to (), the issued provisional constitution in 1970 stipulated that the independence of the judiciary was a fundamental principle in the new constitution. Additionally, it detailed the methods of courts levels and formation, courts jurisdictions, judicial appointments requirements, conditions for the transfer, salary increases, accountability standards, and retirement guidelines (). Similarly, the judicial Oversight Law No 124 of 1979 expanded further this principle since it entrusted the supervisors of the judiciary, who at that time were the judges, with the task of inspecting and overseeing courts and the judicial and administrative work of the judges. This was a major break for the judiciary from the previous practices where the executive and colonial authorities would do their tasks, and in the process creating potential manipulation areas for the judges or even interference with cases. The post-war Iraqi judiciary needs a more detailed examination as there are many instances of Company has occupied the market niche for an automobile in Japan. To overcome the political or executive interference with the independence and the rule of law

Anderson and Pimentel have pointed out that there have also been noted instances of politicians influencing the judiciary. An example of this took place before the parliamentary elections in 2010. The Supreme Commission for Accountability and Justice stated that it had banned more than five hundred nominees from taking part in the elections under the logic that it was upholding the de-Ba’athification laws by doing so. This decision was overturned by the Court of Cassation, as it was deemed that there was insufficient time before the elections to adequately review the claims that had been made against the individuals who would be banned from the elections. The Court of Cassation held that the nominees should all be permitted to take part but their involvement should be a party to a post-election review.

However, the overturning of this decision by the Court of Cassation was extremely unpopular with Iraq’s prime minister. Officials from the Court of Cassation were placed under immense amounts of pressure by the prime minister and attended numerous meetings with him. The court eventually reversed its decision on account of this pressure, only permitting twenty-six candidates to participate in the elections. This move was criticized by the Iraqi people, who believed that it was clear affected by mental or physical health disability. However, research evidence of a deficiency of judicial independence within the nation.

This case casts doubt upon the judiciary’s power to withstand interference and pressure from high-ranking political figures. It has seriously undermined the Iraqi public’s confidence in the nation’s judiciary.[10] It has sent out a message that the judiciary will bow down to politicians if enough pressure is applied to it.

Before the formation of the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court in 2005, the court of Cessation in Iraq was the highest institution of the judiciary. The provisions that governed the work of the federal courts of Cessation were transited from the court of Cessation. The Organization Law gave the Court of Cassation’s Chief justice the power of managing and organizing the procedures of the courts. Moreover, the law established a presidential panel comprised of the chief justice and his deputies and few select members of the judicial commissions. Despite the fact this was a step towards the independence of the judiciary, the oversight Law had a requirement that the chief Justice submits annual reports to the justice Council and the minister of justice. Moreover, the Organic Law of the Justice Ministry empowered the minister to hold meetings and seminars with the judges, including the judges of the Federal court to ensure the goals of the government are fulfilled. This shows that the executive power which is majorly comprised of politicians could infringe upon the court’s independence by allowing direct application channels of policy pressures on courts and on the judges, in addition to influencing their judicial performance.

The chief justice of every Appellate Court District is charged with the duty of overseeing the courts and their duties within an appellate district, including assigning duties to the judges. Moreover, the law established a council in each appellate district to address the challenges and problems facing the courts. The council or the committees were chaired by the chief justice of the appellate courts and also assisted with their deputies. The council was empowered to refine the procedures to be used and also tasked with performance improvement. Even though the court of Cassation was associated with the executive through the Justice Ministry’s operation, the appellate courts are linked directly to the executive influence and oversight(). () indicated that Article 18 entrusted the minister of Justice with the oversight role over all judges and courts, including reviewing their formal and personal conduct. Give that the executive is majorly comprised of politicians, political influence into the judiciary is inevitable.

According to (), the judicial Organization Law mandated the formation of a committee that consists of a Justice Council selected from the members each year at the beginning and three judges. Moreover, articles 3 and 4 of Law No. 101 f 1977 of the Ministry of Justice outlines the procedures on how to initiate a case against a court judge. In summary, the minister of justice initiates a case against a judge or judges by filing a complaint with the committee (). After filing the committee would then review the submissions of both the accused judges or judge and the ministry in terms of the set measures by the law. () asserted that these set measures guarantee defense to the concerned judge and makes the decision of the committee subject to legal challenge (by either the ministry or the accused judge) before a plenary session of Court of Cassation. The principal or the provision that a judge is investigated and even tried by a disciplinary committee in the related matters to his work or profession is against the independence of the judiciary, is politically influenced, and very old. Although the judicial Authority Law and the Judicial Organization law intended to offer a judicial oversight, these laws diverged by only empowering the minister of Justice and not a judicial committee forms to refer a judge or judges to the committee (). () argued that some people may view the mechanism as providing a healthy external check on the judiciary, yet the power restriction to review only by the Justice ministry implied that the judiciary itself has no ability to review its member’s neutrality. This limitation was felt heavily in Iraq when the political pressures grew on the judiciary.

The above discussion and the mentioned provisions on the political influence on the judiciary, clearly shows that the independence of the judiciary must be given great consideration. Post-war Iraq has seen the political authorities coming primarily from the perspective that the judiciary and also to some extent the legislature, should further the aims, policies of the executive. Therefore, the political class did not promote the doctrine of separation of powers (). In reality, the authorities have tried in isolating institutions from the social democratic influence.

() also pointed out that during the period of post-war in Iraq after the downfall of Saddam Hussein, judicial judges have suffered a great deal in executing their duties. The harassment has been in different forms, but typically, the harassment and intimidation have applied tools that make the judges fear for their own lives or the wellbeing of their families. Additionally, out of favor, the judges with the executive have faced many unjustified transfers, removal from the judiciary to a job in the civil service, disbarment from the legal professional, dismissal, and even imprisonment. Furthermore, the control over the judicial profession by the executive resulted in a scenario where qualified lawyers were not permitted to take up jobs in the judiciary because they did not hold the trust of the regime. In contrast, unqualified persons were promoted into the judicial service to effect the desired changes by the ruling political class in the executive. Lastly, the provisions that only allow the minister of Justice to review the judges’ performance had far-reaching consequences during the post-war period.

4- Manipulation of criminal trials

In his opening statement at Nuremberg to the international military Tribunal, Robert Jackson in 1945 (1) stated that the wrongs which people seek to punish or condemn have been so calculated, so devastating and malignant that the civilization can no longer tolerate them being ignored since they cannot even survive being repeated. The great nations stung with injury and flushed with victory, stay the hand of vengeance and submit their captives voluntarily to be judged by law is one of the tributes that power has ever paid significantly to reason. The criminal trials in post-war Iraq have been marred by manipulation. The formation of the Iraqi High Criminal Court, also known as the Iraqi High Tribunal a component of the Domestic structure of Iraq which is independent was warranted under the international Law structure and also accorded with the highest aspirations of the individuals who purported to believe in the rule of law. () pointed out that IHT was formed with the main goal of bringing personal accountability of the responsible Ba’’athist for depriving the Iraqi of their human rights during the Ba’athist regime, and for extinguishing virtually the rule of law for a period of over three decades. Therefore, it was ironic that the mechanisms created by the Iraqi people to address the failings of human rights in the past became another vehicle of suppressing and denying people of their human rights.

The domestic enforcement primacy in Iraq

Genuine justice cannot be achieved on the wings of external manipulation and vengeance. The mechanics on how to establish a judiciary free from manipulation and political control were the first concern of the jurists who assess the formation of IHT in 2003. The jurists were committed to a process that would demonstrate the legal rules’ power and processes, and that would comply with the norms of human rights over personal hatred, tribal animosity, and sectarian revenge(). The very essence of a trial that is fair is one where the verdict is not based on emotion and innuendo, but the introduced quantum of evidence in an open court.

According to (), the Iraqi High Criminal was built on the concept of tourism that the sovereign states retain the major responsibility for adjudicating defined and promulgated crimes violation under international law. (2) pointed out that in 2003, the process of statute development was opaque to the world outside, prompting the observers to criticize the IHT that it would operate as a puppet out of the USA or the occupying power. Moreover, its forerunner, the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST), was created during the united states occupation and its funding came from the united states, for about US $ 128 million to date(3). Moreover, the provisional government appointed by the United States selected the judges and prosecutors who were to be assisted by advisors from the united states. (4) argued that if indeed IST was promulgated as a sham court formed only to accomplish occupation authorities bidding, then it violated the basic human rights of the Ba’’athust officials of having an adjudication of their offenses based on professional judges conscience and highest standards of law free of prejudice and bias.

Another issue that threatens judicial independence in Iraq is allegations that the government manipulates the judicial system to bring about the punishment of political figures’ enemies. The Iraqi Supreme Court has been criticized for its attempts to prosecute Tariq Al Hashemi, the nation’s former vice president, for running death squads.[11] Irrespective of whether or not he truly was guilty of this crime, the prime minister used tactics such as investigations that were conducted by forces that only answered to him[12] and televised confessions to secure a conviction.[13]

The judiciary has attempted to publically distance itself from the confessions that have taken place on television. However, it has taken no action to prevent them from taking place and has permitted them to be used in court,[14] indicating collusion with the government with regards to this issue. It could have implemented an exclusionary rule, stating that research should address pediatric infections and resistant organisms in Aseptic Technique for peripheral IV insertion. There are much evidence that has been obtained by utilizing prejudicial methods is not permissible for use in court. However, it has not done this.[15]

The actions of the court with regards to this manner suggest that it has been unduly influenced by the government. It indicates that the government has used it to punish its rivals and deter others from speaking out against it. This not only suggests a risk to judicial impartiality and independence but also constitutes a genuine threat to democracy within Iraq.

Al Hashemi accused the court of collaborating with the government and displaying no independence. His attorney stated that from the start of the proceedings, it was clear that the judiciary was placed under political pressure. The presiding judge’s reaction to this was to interject and issue a warning that legal proceedings would be brought against the attorney if he carried on with his accusations.[16] It is arguable that in a society in which complete judiciary independence existed, there would be no reason for judges to attempt to silence individuals that questioned their independence. The point can be made that this is evidence that there are issues with the levels of independence that the judiciary in Iraq has.

It has been pointed out that a disproportionate amount of sentences handed out by courts within the Arabic world are given to individuals who display opposition towards the ruling party. El-Din Adeeb has stated that this particular case is an example of this in action and expressed the opinion that it is worrying, as it means that courts of law are being used by politicians for revenge purposes. He has stated that this has the potential to lead to justice being utilized as a tool of oppression.[17] The government using it in this way would signify a lack of judicial independence and effectively mean that the judiciary was a puppet of the government.

In addition to these points, there is also evidence that judges themselves are aligned with political parties, suggesting that their allegiance lies with a political group as opposed to the pursuit of justice irrespective of the political affiliations of the individuals who are involved. Judge Midhat Al Mahmud, who has been criticized for supposedly dominating the judiciary and is also the head of the Iraqi Judicial Council, has been condemned by Mahmud Othman,[18] who is the leader of the Kurdish Socialist Party,[19] for being in attendance at political meetings. Othman claims that he has seen Al Mahmud at several different political gatherings[20]. If this is true then it means that his ability to remain impartial has been severely compromised and represents a major challenge to judicial independence in the nation.

Sowell has pointed out that several cases have also been brought against political opponents of the government for being critical of the government. Member of Iraqi parliament Sabah Al Saidi, who is a longstanding critic of the prime minister, was arrested after claiming that an intelligence report that had been leaked demonstrated that the prime minister was attempting to set him up. Al Ba’ath Party-era statute allowing prosecution for criticizing the state was used against him.

The same statute was used against opposition party members Haidar Al Mulla and Adnan Al Janabi. Al Janabi has been involved in a longstanding personal feud with the Iraqi prime minister. Sowell has stated that the court has the power to refuse to engage in the enforcement of a statute that violates the Iraqi Constitution’s right to people who have been slaves all their lives will eventually have their freedom. The theme song words describe a following, a movement towards the acquisition of freedom of speech. However, instead, it is processing requests to remove parliamentary immunity so that Haidar Al Mulla and Adnan Al Janabi can be prosecuted.[21] It could be argued that this demonstrates collusion with the prime minister against his enemies and that it is evidence that the Iraqi government is by no means impartial.

There is also evidence of political interference with regards to the role of the Supreme Court in the dispute over attempts to declare the region of Salah Al-Din,[22] which has a Sunni majority,[23] as a semiautonomous region. After the Sunni-majority in Salah Al-Din tried to bring about actions aimed at facilitation the declaration of the area as semiautonomous in 2012, which the Constitution permits[24] according to Article 119, which states that semiautonomous regions can be formed if at least a third of provincial representatives and or ten percent of the population are in favor of it,[25] the prime minister issued a statement indicating that they could not do this. This constitutes a direct attempt to interfere in a decision that was ultimately within the hands of the judiciary. The prime minister did not have the authority to act in this manner.[26]

A similar occurrence took place with regards to the region of Diyala.[27] on the nation’s eastern border.[28] After its council members demanded a referendum in an attempt to secure a semiautonomous status for the region, the prime minister imposed martial law upon it.[29] This represents another manipulation of the law by the political powers in Iraq. It demonstrates how political figures can go against the Constitution and the judiciary is powerless to do anything about it.

The prime minister initially stated that he would not permit attempts to transform Diyala into a semiautonomous region because the motive for doing so was supposedly sectarianism. However, seeing as this does not qualify as a legal grounds for failing to follow the Iraqi Constitution with regards to this matter, he then changed his permission and stated that the fact that Diyala is a disputed territory means that this element of the Constitution cannot be implemented there. He used the same logic to prevent attempts to enable Salah Al-Din to become semiautonomous.

On 14 December 2012, the Supreme Court was asked whether or not a province should be permitted to declare itself a semiautonomous region when it is wholly or partially within disputed territory. The court considered this matter for a full two weeks before declining jurisdiction even though this matter is clearly dealt with in the Constitution. It is worth bearing in mind that the Supreme Court only took a single day to review the prime minister’s case against Al Hashemi.[30] There is a clear discrepancy about this matter. It strongly appears as if the court was unwilling to go against the wishes of the prime minister, which suggests that its independence has been compromised by a wish to placate political powers.

This incident could be argued to demonstrate the fact that the Iraqi prime minister possesses the power to close legal channels at will. The disputed status of the two territories in question has been at a deadlock for years due to the conflicting views of Kurds and Arabs in the regions, meaning that he is free to manipulate this issue to prevent them from gaining semiautonomous statuses in the meantime.[31] How he can act outside of the law implies that the judiciary is subservient to him. It definitely is not suggestive of a country in which political figures have no sway over the judiciary and the legal system.

Human Rights Watch has also claimed that the judiciary covers up wrongdoing by commercial forces within Iraq. The charity has drawn attention to the case of a woman who they refer to Hanan AlFadl, which is an alias that they have provided her with to protect her identity. The charity claims that she was a state-affiliated company manager for a firm that approved building projects and made the mistake of refusing to sanction a project involving the use of substandard materials. This mistake would cost her dearly.

AlFadl was shopping for groceries in a central Baghdad marketplace when she was seized by plain-clothed security forces and bundled into a car. She was taken to an office, where she was electrocuted, beaten, and soaked with cold water to attempt to get her to confess to accepting a bribe. She was tortured for hours on end and still refused to confess, but then her captors informed her that they knew the name of her daughter and the school that she attended and threatened to abduct her as well. At this point, AlFadl agreed to confess even though she knew that she was innocent of all wrongdoing.

The security forces took AlFadl to a judge. At this point, the judge should have intervened and prevented the matter from going any further, as it was clear that she had been forced to confess to something that she might not have done. There was clear evidence that she had been beaten, indicating that she had been treated unlawfully.

However, the judge refused to acknowledge the swelling and bruises on her face and did not grant her access to a lawyer. She was consequently convicted of forgery and sentenced to three years imprisonment based upon her forced confession and a witness statement provided by a supposed secret informant.[32] This indicates that the judge was either in collusion with the forces that AlFadl had angered by refusing to sanction the projector that he had been intimidated by them. Either way, it casts dispersions upon the independence of the judiciary in Iraq. It suggests that judicial decisions can be influenced by either force or allegiances to another party.

References

  1. Ibid. 34-46
  2. Ibid.
  3. Courts and Tribunals, ‘Judiciary Independence’ (Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, 2014) <http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/the-judiciary-the-government-and-the-constitution/jud-acc-ind/independence/> accessed 15 Oct 2014
  4. B Anderson & D Pimentel, ‘Judicial Independence in Post-Conflict Iraq: Establishing the Rule of Law in an Islamic Constitutional Democracy’ (2013) 30 ILR
  5. R Pavel, ‘The De-Baathification of Iraq’, (Deep Blue, April 2012) <http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/91888/rpavel.pdf?sequence=1> accessed 29 July 2014
  6. An Al-Saiedi & M Sissons, ‘A Bitter Legacy: Lessons of De-Baathification in Iraq’, (International Center for Transitional Justice, March 2013) < http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Report-Iraq-De-Baathification-2013-ENG.pdf> accessed 11 Nov 2014
  7. R Pavel (n. 14)
  8. Z Al-Ali, The Struggle for Iraq’s Future, (Yale University Press 2014) 132
  9. B Anderson & D Pimentel, ‘Judicial Independence in Post-Conflict Iraq: Establishing the Rule of Law in an Islamic Constitutional Democracy’ (2013) 47-48 ILR
  10. Ibid. 49-50
  11. Alkarama Foundation ‘Annual Report 2013’ (Alkarama Foundation, 2013) <http://en.alkarama.org/documents/AnnualReport2013_EN_WEB.pdf> accessed 18 Sep 2014; Amnesty International ‘Iraq: A Decade of Abuses’ (Amnesty International Schweiz, 2013) <http://www.amnesty.ch/de/laender/naher-osten-nordafrika/irak/dok/2013/ein-jahrzehnt-der-mens chenrechtsverletzungen/Iraq-a-decade-of-abuses-91-p.> accessed 17 July 2014; Daily Mail, ‘Arrest warrant for Iraqi vice-president on terrorism charges fuels fears of civil war between Sunnis and Shiites’, Daily Mail (London, 21December 2011) <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2076413/Arrest-warrant-Tariq-al-Hashemi-fuels-fears-civil-war-Sunnis-Shiites.html> accessed 14 Nov 2014; T Dodge ‘State and society in Iraq ten years after regime change: the rise of a new authoritarianism’ (2013) 241 IA; J Healy ‘Iraq puts on a show with terror confessions’, The Statesman (Austin, USA, 7 January 2012) <http://www.statesman.com/news/news/world/iraq-puts-on-a-show-with-terror-confessions/nRjYk/> accessed 11 Nov 2014; J Healy ‘Iraq Turns Justice Into a Show, and Terror Confessions a Script’, The New York Times (New York, USA, 7 January 2012) <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/08/world/middleeast/iraq-turns-justice-into-a-show-and-terror-confessions-a-script.html?pagewanted=all> accessed 09 July 2014; J Smith ‘Iraq “After” the War: What is Iraq’s Future? What are America’s Intentions?’ (Global Research, 24 December 2011) <http://www.globalresearch.ca/iraq-after-the-war-what-is-iraq-s-future-what-are-america-s-intentions/28333 accessed 30 Aug 2014
  12. K Sowell, ‘Iraq’s Supreme Court yields its independence to Maliki’, The National (Abu Dhabi, UAE, 29 February 2012) <http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/iraqs-supreme-court-yields-its-independence -to-maliki> accessed 05 Nov 2014
  13. BBC ‘Arrest warrant for Iraq Vice-President Tariq al-Hashemi’ (BBC News, 20 December 2011) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16256830> accessed 04 July 2014
  14. K Sowell, ‘Iraq’s Supreme Court yields its independence to Maliki’, The National (Abu Dhabi, UAE, 29 February 2012) <http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/iraqs-supreme-court-yields-its-independence -to-maliki> accessed 12 Sep 2014
  15. Ibid.
  16. Associated Press, ‘Iraq vice-president sentenced to death amid a deadly wave of insurgent attacks’, The Guardian (London, 10 September 2012) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/09/iraq-vice-presiden t-hashemi-death-sentence>
  17. E El-Din Abeeb, ‘Do not manipulate the judiciary’, Asharq Al-Awsat (London, 7 March 2011) <http://www.aawsat.net/2012/11/article55239971> accessed 11 Aug 2014
  18. K Sowell (n. 65)
  19. BBC ‘’Who’s Who in Post-Saddam Iraq’ (BBC News) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/post_saddam_iraq/html/governing_council_members.stm> accessed 17 Nov 2014
  20. K Sowell (n. 65)
  21. Ibid.
  22. Ibid.
  23. International Organization for Migration ‘Salah Al-Din Governorate Profile’ (Relief Web, September 2009) <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/D868B4FF7E857ED185257632005DF9FD-Full_Report.pdf> accessed 18 Nov 2014
  24. K Sowell (n. 65)
  25. H Hamoudi, ‘Notes in Defense of the Iraq Constitution’ (University of Pennsylvania Law School, 6 October 2011) <https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1194-hamoudi33upajintll12772011pdf> accessed 22 Aug 2014
  26. K Sowell (n. 65)
  27. K Sowell, ‘Iraq’s Supreme Court yields its independence to Maliki’, The National (Abu Dhabi, UAE, 29 February 2012) < http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/iraqs-supreme-court-yields-its-independence-to-maliki#page2> accessed 14 Aug 2014
  28. IRIN ‘IRAQ: Diyala the worst province for basic services’ (IRIN News) <http://www.irinnews.org/report/74323/iraq-diyala-the-worst-province-for-basic-services> accessed 11 Aug 2014
  29. Ibid.
  30. Ibid.
  31. Ibid.
  32. Human Rights Watch, ‘No One is Safe’ (Human Rights Watch, 7 February 2014) <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2014/02/06/no-one-safe> accessed 10 Sep 2014